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Abstract—In the recent years, the complexity of the network
data plane and their requirements in terms of agility has
increased significantly, with many network functions now imple-
mented in software and executed directly in datacenter servers.
To avoid bottlenecks and to keep up with the ever increasing
network speeds, recent approaches propose to move the software
packet processing in kernel space using technologies such as
eBPF/XDP, or to offload (part of it) in specialized hardware,
the so called SmartNICs. This paper aims at guiding the reader
through the intricacies of the above mentioned technologies, lever-
aging SmartNICs to build a more efficient processing pipeline and
providing concrete insights on their usage for a specific use case,
namely, the mitigation of Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS)
attacks. In particular, we enhance the mitigation capabilities
of edge servers by transparently offloading a portion of DDoS
mitigation rules in the SmartNIC, thus achieving a balanced
combination of the XDP flexibility in operating traffic sampling
and aggregation in the kernel, with the performance of hardware-
based filtering.
We evaluate the performance in different combinations of host
and SmartNIC-based mitigation, showing that offloading part of
the DDoS network function in the SmartNIC can indeed optimize
the packet processing but only if combined with additional
processing on the host kernel space.
I. INTRODUCTION
With the recent trend of “network softwarization”, promoted
by emerging technologies such as Network Function Virtu-
alization (NFV) and Software Defined Networking (SDN),
system administrators of data center and enterprise networks
have started to replace dedicated hardware-based middleboxes
with virtualized Network Functions (NFs) running on com-
modity servers and end hosts [1]–[6]. This radical change has
facilitated the provisioning of advanced and flexible network
services, ultimately helping the system administrators to cope
with the rapid changes on service requirements and networking
workloads.
Unfortunately, the ever growing network capacity installed
in data center and enterprise networks requires a highly flexi-
ble low-latency network processing, which is hardly achievable
with standard packet processing mechanisms implemented in
the operating systems of servers and end-hosts. Common
solutions rely on kernel bypass approaches, such as DPDK [7]
and Netmap [8], which map the network hardware buffers
directly to user space memory, hence bypassing the operating
system. Although these technologies bring an unquestion-
able performance improvement, they also have two major
limitations. First, they take the ownership of one (or more)
CPU cores, thus permanently stealing precious CPU cycles to
other tasks (NFs deployed on the servers, or user applications
running on the end hosts). Second, they require to install
additional kernel modules or to update the network card driver,
operations that are not always possible in production networks.
Recent technologies such as eBPF [9], [10] and eXpress
Data Path (XDP) [11] offer excellent processing capabilities
without requiring to permanently allocate dedicated resources
in the host; eBPF programs combined with XDP are executed
at the earliest level of the Linux networking stack, directly
upon the receipt of a packet and immediately after the driver
RX queues. Furthermore, eBPF/XDP are included in vanilla
Linux kernels, hence avoiding the need to install custom kernel
modules or additional device drivers.
To further reduce the workload on the precious general-
purpose CPU cores of the servers, system administrators have
resumed the old idea of introducing programmable intelligent
networking adapters (a.k.a., SmartNICs) in their servers [12],
[13], hence combining the flexibility of software network
functions with the improved performance of the hardware NIC
acceleration. SmartNICs offer hardware accelerators that en-
able to partially (or fully) offload packet processing functions;
examples include load balancing [14], key-value stores [15]
or more generic flow-level network functions [16], [17]. On
the other hand, SmartNICs may present additional challenges
due to their limited memory and computation capabilities
compared to current high-performance servers.
In this paper we consider the potential of exploiting Smart-
NICs on a specific use case, i.e., to mitigate volumetric
DDoS attacks, which are considered as one of the major
threats in today’s Internet, accounting for the 75.7% of the
total DDoS attacks [18]–[20]. While the detection of DDoS
attacks is a largely studied problem in the literature with
several algorithms proposed to rapidly and efficiently detect
an ongoing attack, in this paper we focus on the challenges
related to the DDoS attack mitigation; in particular, we explore
how the recent advances on the host data-plane acceleration
can be used to adequately handle the large speeds required by
today’s networks.
This paper provides the following contributions. First, we
analyze the various approaches that can be used to de-
sign an efficient and cost-effective DDoS mitigation solution.
As generally expected, our results show that offloading the
mitigation task to the programmable NIC yields significant
performance improvements; however, we demonstrate also
2that, due to the memory and compute limitations of current
SmartNIC technologies, a fully offloaded solution may lead
to deleterious performance. Second, as a consequence of the
previous findings, we propose the design and implementation
of a hybrid mitigation pipeline architecture that leverages the
flexibility of eBPF/XDP to handle different type of traffic and
attackers and the efficiency of the hardware-based filtering in
the SmartNIC to discard traffic from malicious sources. Third,
we present a mechanism to transparently offload part of the
DDoS mitigation rules into the SmartNIC, which takes into
account the most aggressive sources, i.e., the ones that largely
impact on the mitigation effectiveness.
This rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section II
presents a high-level overview of eBPF and XDP, together
with the SmartNIC and TC Flower, the flow classifier of the
Linux traffic control kernel subsystem. Section III analyzes
the different approaches that can be used to build an efficient
DDoS mitigation solution. Section IV presents the design of an
architecture that uses the above mentioned technologies to both
detect and mitigate DDoS attacks, including the offloading
algorithm adopted to install the rules into the SmartNIC
(Section IV-A1), while keeping the flexibility and improved
performance of the in-kernel XDP packet processing. Finally,
Section V provides the necessary evidence to the previous
findings, Section VI briefly discusses the related works and
Section VII concludes the paper.
II. BACKGROUND
A. extended Berkeley Packet Filter (eBPF)
The extended Berkeley Packet Filter (eBPF) is an enhanced
version of the original BPF virtual machine [21], originally
developed as kernel packet filtering mechanism for the BSD
operating system and used by tools such as tcpdump. Com-
pared to the original version, eBPF enables the execution
of custom bytecode (either interpreted or compiled just-in-
time) at various points of the Linux kernel in a safe manner.
Furthermore, thanks to the support from the Clang/LLVM
compiler, eBPF programs can be written in a restricted-C
language, which is then compiled into the corresponding eBPF
object file that can be loaded into the kernel through the
apposite bpf() system call. In addition to the improved
and enriched instruction set, eBPF offers several pre-defined
data structures (e.g., hash map, lru map, array) that can
be read/written from either kernel or userspace program,
hence providing the possibility to modify the behavior of an
eBPF program based upon dynamically changing operating
conditions. Moreover, it provides helper functions that can
either be used to implement complex features that may not be
feasible in the eBPF restricted-C, or to interact with kernel-
level functionalities. Finally, eBPF programs can be cascaded
in order to create larger service chains. The above additional
capabilities allow eBPF to provide its functions in a broad
range of kernel-level use cases, such as tracing, security
and networking. In particular, in the latter case, this special-
purpose event-driven virtual machine enables arbitrary packet
processing on incoming/outgoing traffic directly in the Linux
kernel, with the possibility to re-configure the existing eBPF
programs to adapt to the (dynamically changing) operating
conditions. This provides an unique option for flexibility and
efficiency that was not available before.
1) eXpress Data Path (XDP): Networking eBPF programs
can be attached to different points of the Linux stack. Starting
from Linux kernel v4.8, the eXpress Data Path (XDP) provides
the possibility to execute those programs at the lowest level
of the TCP/IP stack, in the NIC driver itself, before the
allocation of costly kernel data structures (e.g., sk_buff),
thus achieving the best possible packet processing performance
in the kernel stack. As consequence, they represent the best
choice to detect and drop malicious packets with minimal
consumption of the host CPU resources, and will represent
one of the key technologies exploited in this paper.
B. SmartNICs
Smart Network Interface Cards (SmartNICs) are intelligent
adapters used to boost the performance of servers by offloading
(part of) the network processing workload from the host CPU
to the NIC itself [22]. Although the term SmartNIC is being
widely used in the industry and academic world, there is still
some confusion over the precise definition. We consider tra-
ditional NICs the devices that provide several pre-defined of-
floaded functions (e.g., transmit/receive segmentation offload,
checksum offload) without including a fully programmable
processing path, e.g., which may involve the presence of a
general-purpose CPU on board. In our context, a SmartNIC is
a NIC equipped with a fully-programmable system-on-chip
(SoC) multi-core processor that is capable to run a fully-
fledged operating system, offering more flexibility and hence
potentially taking care of any arbitrary network processing
task. This type of SmartNIC can also be enhanced with a
set of specialized hardware functionalities that can be used to
accelerate specific class of functions (e.g., OpenvSwitch data-
plane) or to perform generic packet and flow-filtering. On the
other hand, they have limited compute and memory capabil-
ities, making not always possible (or efficient) to completely
offload all types of tasks. Furthermore, SmartNICs feature their
own operating system and therefore may have to be handled
separately from the host. For instance, offloading a network
task to the SmartNIC may require the host to have multiple
interactions with the card, such as to compile and inject the
new eBPF code, to execute additional commands (either on the
host, or directly on the card) to exploit the available features
such as configure hardware co-processors. Finally, no current
standard exist to interact with SmartNICs, hence different (and
often proprierary) methods have to be implemented when the
support of several manufacturers is required.
C. TC Flower
The Flow Classifier is a feature of the Linux Traffic Control
(TC) kernel subsystem that provides the possibility to match,
modify and apply different actions to a packet based on the
flow it belongs to. It offers a common interface for hardware
vendors to implement an offloading logic within their devices;
when a TC Flower rule is added, active NIC drivers check
if that rule is supported in hardware; in that case the rule is
3pushed to the physical card, causing packets to be directly
matched in the hardware device, hence resulting in greater
throughput and a decrease of the host CPU usage.
TC Flower represents a promising technology that can hide
the differences between different hardware manufacturers, but
it not able (yet) to support all the high-level features that may
be available in modern SmartNICs.
III. DDOS MITIGATION: APPROACHES
Once a DDoS attack is detected, efficient packet dropping
is a fundamental part of a DDoS attack mitigation solution. In
a typical DDoS mitigation pipeline, a set of mitigation rules
are deployed in the server’s data plane to filter the malicious
traffic. The strategy used to block the malicious sources may
be determined by several factors such as the characteristics
of the server (e.g., availability of a SmartNIC, its hardware
capabilities), the characteristics of the malicious traffic (e.g.,
number of attackers) or the type and complexity of the rules
that are used to classify the illegitimate traffic. In particular,
we envision the following three approaches.
1) Host-based mitigation: In this case all traffic (either
malicious or legitimate) is processed by the host CPU, which
drops incoming packets that match a given blacklist of ma-
licious sources; this represents the only viable option if the
system lacks of any underlying hardware speedup.
All the host-based mitigation techniques and tools used
today fall in two different macro-categories depending on
whether packets are processed at kernel or user-space level.
Focusing on Linux-based system, the first category includes
iptables and its derivatives, such as nftables, which
represent the main tools used to mitigate DDoS attacks. It
allows to express complex policies to the traffic, filtering
packets inside the netfilter subsystem. However, the deep
level in the networking stack where the packet processing
occurs causes poor performance when coping with increasing
speed of the today’s DDoS attacks, making this solution
practically unfeasible, as demonstrated in Section V.
As opposite to kernel-level processing, a multitude of fast
packet I/O frameworks relying on specialized NIC/networking
drivers and user-space processing have been built over the past
years. Examples such as Netmap [8], DPDK [7], PF RING
ZC [23] rely on a small kernel component that maps the NIC
device memory directly to user space, hence making it di-
rectly available to (network-specialized) userland applications
instead of relying on normal kernel data-path processing. This
approach provides huge performance benefits compared to the
standard kernel packet processing but incurs in several non-
negligible drawbacks. First of all, these frameworks require
to take the exclusive ownership of the NIC, so that all
packets received are processed by the userspace application.
This means that, in a DDoS mitigation scenario, packets
belonging to legitimate sources have to be inserted back into
the kernel, causing unnecessary packet copies that slow down
the performance1. Furthermore, these frameworks require the
1It is worth mentioning that Netmap has a better kernel integration
compared to DPDK; in fact, it is possible to inject packets back into the kernel
by just passing a pointer, without any copy. However, it is still subjected to
a high CPU consumption compared to eBPF/XDP.
fixed allocation of one (or more) CPU cores to the above
programs, independently from the presence of an ongoing
attack, hence reducing the performance-cost ratio, as precious
CPU resources are no longer available for normal processing
tasks (e.g., virtual machines).
XDP can be considered as a mix of the previous approaches.
It is technically a kernel-space framework, although XDP
programs can be injected from userspace to the kernel, after
guaranteeing that all security properties are satisfied. XDP
programs are executed in the kernel context but as early
as possible, well before the netfilter framework, hence
providing an improvement of an order of magnitude compared
to iptables. The adoption of XDP to implement packet
filtering functionalities has grown over the years; (i) its perfect
integration with the Linux kernel makes it more efficient
to pass legitimate packets up to the stack, (ii) its simple
programming model makes it easy to express customized
filtering rules without taking care of low-level details such as
required by common user-space framework and (iii) its event-
driven execution gives the possibility to consume resources
only when necessary, providing a perfect trade-off between
performance and CPU consumption.
2) SmartNIC-based mitigation: If the server is equipped
with a SmartNIC, an alternative approach would be to offload
the entire mitigation task to this device. This enables to
dedicate all the available resources on the host CPU to the
target workloads, operating only on the legitimate traffic,
freeing the host CPU from spending precious CPU cycles in
the mitigation.
However, although SmartNICs (by definition) support arbi-
trary data path processing, they often differ on how this can
be achieved. Possible options range from running a custom
executable, which should already be present on the card, to
dynamically inject a new program created on the fly, e.g.,
thanks to technologies such as XDP or P4, or to directly
compile those programs into the hardware device [24]. This
makes more cumbersome the implementation of offloading
features that run on cards from multiple manufacturers.
In our context, we envision two different options: (i) exploit
any hardware filter (if available) in the SmartNIC and, if
the number of blacklisted addresses exceeds the capability
of the hardware (which may be likely, given the typical size
of the above structure), block the rest of the traffic with a
custom dropping program (e.g., XDP) running on the NIC
CPU; (ii) block all the packets in software, running entirely
on the SmartNIC CPU, e.g., in case the card does not have
any hardware filtering capability. In both cases, the surviving
(benign) traffic is redirected to the host where the rest of
server applications are running. An evaluation of the above
possibilities will be carried out in Section V.
3) Hybrid (SmartNIC + XDP Host): An alternative strategy
that combines the advantages of the previous approaches
would be to adopt a hybrid solution where part of the malicious
traffic is dropped by the SmartNIC (reducing the overhead
on the host’s CPU) and the remaining part is handled on the
host, possibly leveraging the much greater processing power
available in modern server CPUs compared to the one available
in embedded devices.
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Fig. 1: High-level architecture of the system.
In this scenario, we exploit the fixed hardware functions
commonly available in the current SmartNICs to perform
stateless matching on selected packet fields and apply simple
actions such as modify, drop or allow packets. To avoid
redirecting all the traffic to the (less powerful) SmartNIC
CPU, we could let it pass through the above hardware tables
(where the match/drop is performed at line rate) and forward
the rest of the packets to the host, where the remaining part
of the mitigation pipeline is running. However, given the
limited number of entries often available in the above hardware
tables, which are not enough to contain the large number
of mitigation rules needed during a large DDoS attack, the
whole list of dropping targets is partitioned between the NIC
and the host dropping program (e.g., XDP). This requires
specific algorithms to perform this splitting, which should
keep into account the difference in terms of supported rules
and their importance. Interesting, this scenario in which the
companion filtering XDP program is executed in the server
is also compatible with some traditional NICs that support
fixed hardware traffic filtering, such as Intel cards with Flow
Director2. In this case, the mitigation module can use the card-
specific syntax (e.g., Flow Director commands) to configure
filtering rules, with the consequent decrease of the filtering
processing load in the host.
IV. ARCHITECTURE AND IMPLEMENTATION
This section presents a possible architecture that can be used
to compare the previous three approaches in the important use
case of the DDoS mitigation, enabling a fair comparison of
their respective strength and weaknesses in the implementa-
tion of an efficient and cost-effective mitigation pipeline. In
particular, we present the different components constituting
the proposed architecture (shown in Figure 1) and their role,
together we some implementation details that result from the
use of the assessed technologies.
2The Flow Director is an Intel feature that supports advanced filters and
packet processing in the NIC; for this reason it is often used in scenarios
where packets are small and traffic is heavy (e.g., DoS attacks).
A. Mitigation
The first program encountered in the pipeline is the filtering
module, which matches the incoming traffic against the list
of blacklisted entries to drop packets coming from malicious
sources; surviving packets are redirected to the host where
additional (more advanced) checks can be performed before
redirecting packets directly to the next program in the pipeline
(i.e., the feature extraction).
Although our architecture is flexible enough to instantiate
the filtering program in different locations (e.g., SmartNIC,
Host, and even partitioned across the two above), at the
beginning we instantiate an XDP filtering program in the host
in order to obtain the necessary traffic information and decide
the best mitigation strategy. If the userspace DDoS mitigation
module recognizes the availability of the hardware offload
functionality in the SmartNIC, it starts adding the filtering
rules into the hardware tables, causing malicious packet to
be immediately dropped in hardware. However, since those
tables have often a limited size (typically ∼1-2K entries), we
place the most active top-K malicious talkers in the SmartNIC
hardware tables, where K is the size of those tables, while
the remaining ones are filtered by the XDP program running
either on the SmartNIC CPU or on the host, depending on
a configuration option that enables us to compare the results
with different operating conditions.
1) Offloading algorithm: The selection of the top-K mali-
cious talkers that are most appropriate for hardware offloading
is carried out by the rate monitor module, which computes a
set of statistics on the dropped traffic and applies a hysteresis-
based function to predict the advantages of possibly modifying
the list of offloaded rules that are active in the SmartNIC. In
fact, altering this list requires either computational resources or
time (in our card a single rule update may require up to 2 ms),
which may be unnecessary if the rank of the new top-K rules
does not effectively impact on the mitigation effectiveness.
The pseudo-code of our algorithm is shown in Listing 1.
First, it computes a list of the global top-K sources, which
contains both SmartNIC and XDP entries sorted in descending
order according to their rate, and a second list containing only
the offloaded entries, i.e., the ones present in the SmartNIC
hardware tables, which is arranged in ascending order. Next, it
computes the difference of the above lists, resulting in two lists
containing two disjoint set of elements; the first list contains
all the candidate rules that are not yet in the SmartNIC and the
second list includes the SmartNIC entries that are not in the
top-K anymore. At this point, starting from the first element
of the former list, it calculates the possible benefit obtained
by removing the first entry of the second list (given by the
ratio between the rate of the two entries) and inserting this
new entry in the SmartNIC; if the value is greater than a
certain threshold, the entry is moved into the offloaded list
and the algorithm continues with the next entry. This threshold
is adjusted according to the current volume of DDoS traffic
and it is inversely proportional to it; this avoids unnecessary
changes in the top-K SmartNIC list when the traffic rate is low
(compared to the maximum achievable rate), which may bring
a negligible improvement. On the other hand, it increases the
5Algorithm 1 Offloading algorithm
Input: K , the max # of supported SmartNIC entries
Output: υ′
k
← The list of SmartNIC entries.
1: γk ← TOP-K Global entries
2: υk ← TOP-K SmartNIC entries
3: SORTDESCENDING(γk )
4: SORTASCENDING(υk )
5: γ′
k
← γk - υk . Remove already offloaded entries
6: υ′
k
← υk - γk . List of non TOP-K rules
7: for each γ′
i,k
∈ γ′
k
do
8: βi ← OFFLOADGAIN(γ′i,k, υ′i,k )
9: if βi ≥ threshold then
10: υ′
k
← υ′
k
− υ′
i,k
. Remove old entry from offload list
11: υ′
k
← υ′
k
+ γ′
i,k
. Add new entry into offload list
12: end if
13: end for
update likelihood when the volume of traffic is close to the
maximum achievable rate; in this scenario, where the system
is overloaded, mitigating even slightly more aggressive talkers
may introduce substantial performance benefits.
B. Feature extraction
Although not strictly belonging to the mitigation pipeline,
the feature extraction module monitors the incoming traffic
and collects relevant parameters required by the mitigation
algorithm (e.g., counting the number of packets for each
combination of source and destination hosts). Being placed
right after the mitigation module, it receives all the (presumed)
benign traffic that has not been previously dropped so that can
be further analyzed and then passed up to the target applica-
tions. XDP represents the perfect technology to implement this
component since it provides (i) the low overhead given by the
kernel-level processing and (ii) the possibility to dynamically
change the behavior of the system by re-compiling and re-
injecting (in the kernel) an updated program when we require
the extraction of a different set of features . Moreover, XDP
offers the possibility to export the extracted information into
specific key-value data structures shared between the kernel
and userspace (i.e., where the DDoS attack detection algorithm
is running) or to directly send the entire packet up to userspace
if a more in-depth analysis is needed.
In the former case, data are stored in a per-CPU eBPF
hash map, which is periodically read by the userspace attack
detection application. Since multiple instances of the same
XDP program are executed in parallel on different CPU cores,
each one processing a different packet, the use of a per-CPU
map guarantees very fast access to data thanks to its per-core
dedicated memory; consequently data are never realigned with
the other caches present on other CPU cores, avoiding the
cost of cache synchronization. As result, each instance of the
feature extraction works independently, saving the statistics
of each IP source/destination on its own private map. In the
latter case, a specific eBPF helper is used to copy packets to
a perf event ring buffer, which is then read by the userspace
application.
Analysis and Aggregation. Computed traffic statistics are
retrieved from each kernel-level hash-map, aggregated by the
companion userspace application and saved in memory for
further processing. However, this process was found to be
relatively slow; our tests report an average of 30µs to read
a single entry from the eBPF map, requiring more than
ten seconds to process the entire dataset in case of large
DDoS attacks (e.g., ∼300K entries). In fact, eBPF does not
provide any possibility to read an entire map within a single
bpf() system call, hence requiring to read each single value
separately. As consequence, to guarantee coherent data to the
userspace detection application, we should lock the entire
table while reading the values, but this would result in the
impossibility for the kernel to process the current incoming
traffic for a considerable amount of time.
To avoid the above problem, we adopted a swappable dual-
map approach, in which the userspace application reads data
from a first eBPF map that represents a snapshot of the traffic
statistics at a given time, while the XDP program computes the
traffic information for the incoming packets received in the the
previous timespan, and saved in a second map. This process is
repeated every time the periodic user-space detection process
is triggered, hence allowing the detection algorithm to always
work with consistent data. From the implementation point of
view, we opted for a swappable dual-program approach instead
of a swappable dual-map because of its reduced swapping
latency. We create two feature extraction XDP programs, each
one with its own hash-map, and swap them atomically by
asking the filtering module to dynamically update the address
of the next program in the pipeline, which basically means
updating the target address of an assembly jump instruction.
C. Detection
The identification of a DDoS attack is performed by the
detection module, which operates on the traffic statistics
presented in the previous section and exploits the retrieved
information to identify the right set of malicious sources,
which are then inserted in the blacklist map used by the
filtering module to drop the traffic.
Since the selection of the best mitigation algorithm is out
of the focus of this paper, we provide here only a small
description of the possible choices that, however, need to be
carefully selected depending on the characteristics of the envi-
ronment and the type of workloads running on the end-hosts.
In fact, different approaches are available [19], [25] falling in
two main categories: (i) anomaly-based detection mechanisms
such as entropy-based approaches [26]–[28], used to detect
variations in the distribution of traffic features observed in
consecutive timeframes and (ii) signature-based approaches
that employ a-priori knowledge of attack signatures to match
incoming traffic and detect intrusions.
It is important to note that the type of detection algo-
rithm may influence the exported traffic information on the
feature extraction module; however, thanks to the excellent
programmability of XDP we can change the behavior of the
program without impacting on the rest of the architecture.
D. Rate Monitor
Sometimes, a given detection algorithm may erroneously
detect some legitimate sources as attackers. To counter this
6situation, a specific mechanism is used to eliminate from the
blacklist a source that is no longer considered malicious, e.g.,
because it was considered an attacker by mistake or because it
does no longer participate to the attack. This task is performed
by the rate monitor, which starts from the global list of
blacklisted addresses, sorted according to their traffic volume,
and examines the entries that are at the bottom of the list (i.e.,
the ones sending less traffic), comparing them with a threshold
value; if the current transmission rate of the source under
consideration is below the threshold, defined as the highest
rate of packets with the same source observed under normal
network activity, it is removed from the blacklist. In case the
host is removed by mistake, the detection algorithm will re-add
to the list of malicious sources in the next iteration.
V. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
This section provides an insight of the benefits of Smart-
NICs in the important use case of DDoS mitigation. First,
it outlines the test environment and the evaluation metrics;
then, exploiting the previously described architecture, it an-
alyzes different approaches that exploit SmartNICs and/or
other recent Linux technologies such as eBPF/XDP for DDoS
mitigation, comparing with the performance achievable with
commonly used Linux tools (i.e., iptables).
A. Test environment
Our testbed includes a first machine used as packet gener-
ator, which creates a massive DDoS attack with an increasing
number of attack sources, and a second server running the
DDoS mitigation pipeline. Both servers are equipped with an
Intel Xeon E3-1245 v5 with a quad-core CPU @3.50GHz,
8MB of L3 cache and two 16GB DDR4-2400 RAM mod-
ules, running Ubuntu 18.04.2 LTS and kernel 4.15. The two
machines are linked with two 25Gbps SmartNICs, with each
port directly connected to the corresponding one of the other
server.
We used Pktgen-DPDK v3.6.4 and DPDK v19.02 to gen-
erate the UDP traffic (with small 64B packets) simulating the
attack. We report the dropping rate of the system and the CPU
usage, which are the two fundamental parameters to keep into
account during an attack. We also measure the capability of
the server to perform real work (i.e., serve web pages) while
under attack, comparing the results of the different mitigation
approaches. In this case, the legitimate traffic is generated
using the open-source benchmarking tool weighttp, which
creates a high number of parallel TCP connections towards the
device under test; in this case we count only the successfully
completed TCP sessions.
B. Mitigation performance
The first test measures the ability of the server to react
to massive DDoS attacks that involve an increasing number
of sources (i.e., bots), showing the performance of different
mitigation approaches in terms of dropping rate (Mpps) and
CPU consumption. We generate 64B UDP packets at line-
rate at 25Gbps (i.e., 37.2Mpps); we consider both a scenario
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Fig. 2: Dropping rate with an increasing number of attackers.
(a): uniformly distributed traffic; (b): traffic normally dis-
tributed among all sources.
where the traffic is uniformly distributed among all sources
(Figure 2a) and a situation where the traffic generated by each
source follows a Gaussian distribution (Figure 2b). In addition,
we report the CPU consumption for the first test (uniform
distribution) in Figure 3.
1) Iptables: One of the most common approaches for
DDoS attacks mitigation relies on iptables, a Linux tool
anchored to the netfilter framework that can filter traffic,
perform network address translation and manipulate packets.
For this test we deployed all the rules containing the source IPs
to drop in the PREROUTING netfilter chain, which provides
higher efficiency compared to the more common INPUT
chain, which is encountered later in the networking stack.
Figure 2a and 2b show how the dropping rate of iptables
are rather limited, around 2.5-4.5Mpps, even with a relatively
small number of attack sources, making this solution incapable
of dealing with the massive DDoS attacks under consideration.
This is mainly given by the linear matching algorithm used
by iptables, whose performance degrade rapidly when an
increasing number of rules are used, leading to a throughput
almost equal to zero with more than 4K rules. The CPU
consumption (Figure 3) confirms this limitation; using iptables
to mitigate large DDoS attacks would saturate the CPUs of the
system, which would be occupied discarding traffic rather then
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Fig. 3: CPU usage of the different mitigation approaches under
a simulated DDoS attack (uniform distribution).
executing the target services.
2) Host-based mitigation: Compared to iptables, XDP in-
tercepts packets at a lower level of the stack, right after the
NIC driver. This test runs the entire mitigation pipeline in
XDP without any help from the SmartNIC, which simply
redirects all the packets to the host where the XDP program
is triggered. The dropping efficiency of XDP is much higher
than iptables, being able to discard ∼26Mpps up to 1K sources,
and still ∼10Mpps with 128K attackers, using all CPU cores
of the target machine3. This performance degradation is due to
the eBPF map used (BPF_HASH), in which the lookup time,
needed to match the IP source of the current packet against
the blacklist, is influenced by the total number of map entries.
3) SmartNIC-based mitigation: In this case the mitigation
pipeline is executed entirely on the SmartNIC. We performed
a first test where the attack is mitigated only through an XDP
filtering program in the SmartNIC CPU, without any help
from the hardware filter. Results shown in Figures 2a and 2b
confirm a performance degradation compared to the host-based
mitigation due to the slower CPU of the NIC, balanced by
the fact that we do not consume any CPU cycles in the host
(Figure 3), hence leaving room for other applications.
A second test exploits a mixture of hardware filtering and
XDP-based software filtering in the card. Results demon-
strate that for relatively small attack sources (less than 512),
the dropping rate is equal to the maximum achievable rate
(37.2Mpps); in fact, the first K rules (where K=512 in our
card) are inserted in the SmartNIC hardware tables, causing
all the packets to be dropped at line rate. However, when
dealing with larger attacks (greater than 1K), the dropping rate
immediately decreases, since an increasing number of entries
stay outside the SmartNIC hardware tables; as a consequence,
the dropping rate is influenced by the performance of the XDP
program running in the SmartNIC CPU. This approach may
be reasonable when the DDoS attack rate does not exceed
the maximum achievable dropping rate in the SmartNIC CPU,
which in our case is approximately 15Mpps; handling more
massive attacks will cause the SmartNIC to drop packets
without processing, with an higher chances to drop also
legitimate traffic, as highlighted in Section V-C.
3In our case, the limiting factor is our Intel Xeon E3-1245 CPU, which is
able to drop around 10Mpps within a single core, as opposed to other (more
powerful) CPUs that are able to achieve higher rates (e.g., 24Mpps [11]).
4) Hybrid (NIC Hardware Tables + XDP Host): In this
case the offloading algorithm splits the mitigation pipeline
between the SmartNIC hardware tables and the XDP filtering
program running in the host. We notice that for large attacks,
the dropping rate is considerably higher than the HW + XDP
SmartNIC case, thanks to the higher performance of the host
CPU compared to the SmartNIC one. Although hardware
filtering is available also on some “traditional” NICs (e.g.,
Intel with Flow Director), we were unable to implement the
hybrid approach in them because of the unavailability of
hardware counters to measure the dropped packets for each
source, which are required by our algorithm; however, we
cannot exclude that other mitigation algorithms can leverage
the hardware speed-up provided by the above cards as well.
5) Final considerations: Figures 2a and 2b confirm a
clear advantage of the hardware offloading, which is even
more evident depending on the distribution of the traffic. For
instance, in the second scenario (Figure 2b, with some sources
generating more traffic than others) we can reach even higher
dropping performance, thanks to the offloading algorithm that
places the top-K malicious talkers in the SmartNIC, resulting
in more traffic dropped in hardware. Also the CPU consump-
tion shown in Figure 3 confirms the clear advantage of the
offloading, particularly when most of the traffic is handled by
the hardware of the SmartNIC, hence avoiding the host CPU
to take care of the above portion of malicious traffic. It is
worth noticing that the case where a server has to cope with a
limited number of malicious sources may be rather common,
as the incoming traffic in datacenters may be balanced across
multiple servers (backends), each one being asked to handle
a portion of the connections and, hence, also a subset of the
current attackers.
C. Effect on legitimate traffic
This test evaluates the capability of the system to perform
useful work (e.g., serve web pages) even in presence of a
DDoS attack. We generate 64Bytes UDP packets towards
the server simulating different attack rates and number of
attackers, while a weighttp client generates 1M HTTP
requests (using 200 concurrent clients) towards the nginx
server running on the target device. The capability of the server
to perform real work is reported by the number of successfully
completed requests/s, with a timeout of 5 seconds, varying the
rate of DDoS traffic.
Results, depicted in Figures 4a and 4b show the performance
with 1K and 4K attackers respectively. In the first case,
both hardware-based solutions reach the same number of
connection/s, since almost all entries are dropped by the
hardware, leaving the host’s CPU free to perform real work.
The same behavior can be noticed when the mitigation is
performed entirely on the SmartNIC CPU; in this case, the
host’s CPU is underused, achieving the maximum number of
HTTP requests/s that the DUT is able to handle. However, the
performance immediately drop when the attack rate exceeds
15Mpps, which is the maximum rate that the SmartNIC CPU
sustain; in such scenario, NIC queues become rapidly full,
hence dropping packets without going through the mitigation
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Fig. 4: Number of successfully completed HTTP requests/s
under different load rates of a DDoS attack carried out by (a)
1K attackers and (b) 4K attackers.
pipeline and increasing the chance to drop also legitimate
traffic. With respect to the XDP Host mitigation, we notice that
the number of connections/s is initially lower, in presence of
small attack rates, compared to the SmartNIC-based solution,
since the host’s CPU has to handle the HTTP requests and,
at the same time, execute the XDP program. However, when
the rate of the attack grows, it will continue to handle an
adequate number of connections/s until 25Mpps, which is the
maximum rate that the host XDP program is able to handle.
Finally, iptables-based mitigation results unfeasible with large
attack sources because of its very poor processing efficiency,
severely impacting on the capability of the server to handle
the legitimate traffic.
The same analysis is valid for larger attacks (e.g., 4K
sources); the main difference here is that the HW + XDP Host
solution performs significantly better in this case, thanks to the
higher processing capabilities of the host’s CPU compared to
the SmartNIC ones.
VI. RELATED WORK
The advantages of using XDP to filter packets at high
rates have been largely discussed and demonstrated [29], [30];
several companies (e.g., Facebook, Cloudflare) have integrated
XDP in their data center networks to protect end hosts from
unwanted traffic, given the enormous benefits from both filter-
ing performance and low resource consumption. In particular,
in [31] Cloudflare presented a DDoS mitigation architecture
that was initially based on kernel bypass, to overcome the
performance limitations of iptables, and classical BPF to filter
packets in userspace. However they shifted soon to an XDP-
based architecture called L4Drop [32] that performs packet
sampling and dropping within an XDP program itself. Our
approach is slightly different; we use an XDP program to
extract the relevant packet headers from all the received traffic,
instead of sending the entire samples to the userspace detection
application and we consider simpler filtering rules, which
are needed to deal with the SmartNIC hardware limitations.
Finally, we consider in our architecture the use of SmartNICs
to improve the packet processing, which introduces additional
complexity (e.g., select rules to offload), which are not needed
in a host-based solution. In this direction, [33] analyzed
and proposed a hybrid architecture that use SmartNIC to
improve VNFs processing capabilities; however, to the best
of our knowledge, this work is the first that analyzes and
proposes a complete hardware/software architecture for the
DDoS mitigation use case.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
Given the sheer increase in the amount of traffic handled by
modern datacenters, SmartNICs represent a promising solution
to offload part of the network processing to dedicated (and
possibly more optimized) components. This paper presents an
analysis of the various approaches that could be adopted to
introduce SmartNICs in server-based data plane processing,
assessing the achievable results in particular for the DDoS
mitigation use case under different alternatives. In this re-
spect, the paper describe a solution that combines SmartNICs
with other recent technologies such as eBPF/XDP to handle
large amounts of traffic and attackers. The key aspect of
our solution is the adaptive hardware offloading mechanism,
which partitions the attacking sources to be filtered among
SmartNIC and/or host, smartly delegating the filtering of the
most aggressive DDoS sources to former.
According to our experiments, the best approach is a
combination of hardware filtering on the SmartNIC and XDP
software filtering on the host, which results more efficient in
terms of dropping rate and CPU usage. In fact, running part
of the filtering pipeline on the SmartNIC CPU would bring to
inferior dropping performance due to its slower CPU, resulting
in a lower capability to cope with large and massive DDoS
attacks.
Our findings suggest that current SmartNICs can help
mitigating the network load on congested servers, but may
not represent a turn-key solution. For instance, an effective
SmartNIC-based solution for DDoS attacks may require the
presence of a DDoS-aware load balancer that distributes
incoming datacenter traffic in a way to reduce the amount
of attackers landing on each server, whose number should
be compatible with the size of the hardware tables of the
SmartNIC. Otherwise, the solution may require the software
running on the SmartNICs to cooperate with other components
9running on the host, reducing the effectiveness of the solution
in terms of saved resources in the servers.
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